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In his book, Behavior of Law (1976), Donald Black examines 
the relationship between more general forms of social control and 
law, a form of social control distinguished from the rest because 
it is governmentally imposed. 
Social control, says Black, "defines and responds to deviant 
behavior, specifying what ought to be: what is right or wrong, 
what is a violation, obligation, abnormality, or disruption." 
(1976:105). In its variant forms it is more than governmental 
edict. It includes custom and ethics. 
By its response, it establishes the etiquette of the setting, 
whether that setting is an urban sidewalk or the boardwalk of an 
Eskimo village. 
Law for Black is "governmental social control . . • .  It is, 
in other words, the normative life of a state and its citizens, 
such as legislation, litigation, and adjudication." (1976:2). 
For Black, then, most "primitive societies" may have social 
control, but very clearly lack law as he has defined it. 
Legal anthropologists of the modern school would question 
such a narrow definition of law, some preferring to use the term 
law as nearly synonymous with what Black defines as "social 
control" (see, Pospisil:1967). Others, more conservatively, 
would find group response to deviant behavior, whether customary 
or whether institutionalized, to be law enough in its regularity 
and societal impact to be law. 
For the purposes of this paper, however, Black's more ethno-
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centric view of law as essentially the activities of Western law 
institutions serves well as we examine its relationship and 
impact to other forms of social control, flowing from Eskimo 
custom over time. 
No relationship is more mysterious to me than that of the one 
which exists between legal process and other forms of social 
control. We can confirm an interrelationship; many have done so. 
But how do the two powerful influences upon behavior influence 
one another? 
Does law displace social control or merely fill a vaccum? 
Does law, or rather the instrumental reaction of law-givers to 
what they perceive as deviant behavior, actually strengthen and 
reconfirm that deviance? How might law-givers anticipate and 
resolve such a destructive tendency? How might they repair and 
enhance a working relationship between law and social control, or 
at least replace productive social control with productive law? 
My study of this question has been focused upon an environ­
ment where Western law and Inuit and Yupik social control merge: 
the great Alaskan bush where more than 200 Native villages of 300 
persons on average are scattered on tundra and coastline. I have 
also examined literature on the Canadian Eskimoes. The focus of 
my inquiry is upon the community perceptions of those who have 
acted out while intoxicated or while mentally ill, their charac­
terization of such behavior and their reactions to it. 
In this paper I attempt to distill from these events and from 
those who have studied them what might be termed guides to the 
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inner logic of Eskimo social control. My belief is that with 
some appreciation of the inner logic of Eskimo social control -
especially its approved upon etiquette where drinking and 
violence are concerned - that legal approaches and legal measures 
can be reexamined to determine how they affect these underlying 
premises of social control for good and not for ill. 
In an unpublished paper, a former Alaska psychiatrist (Bloom, 
197 5) describes what he terms are patterns of Eskimo homicide. 
He analyzes two village homicides performed by Alaska Eskimos who 
acted (according to his diagnosis) under the influence of liquor 
and as a result of a mental illness. The mental illness is 
described as ego-dystonic or dissociative. 
Bloom explains that the conflict between the killer and vic­
tim (or other village people) extended over a lengthy period on 
an unconscious level. Its resolution in violence was precipi­
tated by seemingly insignificant events which occurred while the 
victim and killer were drinking. 
Characteristically, each killer viewed his act of homicide as 
the act of someone else or simply forgot it. In one instance, 
the murderer was a store manager and in another the village chief 
of police. The victims were close acquaintances. 
In elaboration, Bloom suggests that the psychopathology of 
these cases underlies a rise in reported murders and suicides in 
Eskimo villages during the late 1960s, and that has extended into 
the present decade (Kelso, 1977). They are no more than more 
deadly examples of what he views as endemic liquor-related acts 
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of violence, notable for their dissociative psychiatric charac­
ter. He states: 
Dissociative episodes seem to lie at the core of the 
Pibloktoq syndrome and hysterical mechanisms have 
repeatedly been postulated as operative in basic Eskimo 
personality dynamics . . .  It seems clear that dissocia­
tion associated with violence is in the service of ego­
denial of the dread hos ti le wishes. The denial 
associated with alcohol and dissociation is profound and 
stubborn. 'It is not me, it was someone else' or 'it 
was the drinks' are common statements made after a 
violence event. The extensive denial, the long training 
envolved in the inhibition of hostility and the con­
sequent reluctance to make anger conscious and verbal 
all lead to great difficulties in psychotherapy. " 
(1975:10-11) 
Independent research by the author (Conn, 1975, 1980, 1981, 
1982) and with Hippler (Conn and Hippler, 1973, 1974, 1975) in 
Alaska Eskimo villages suggests that there are indeed many 
examples of reported and unreported interpersonal violence. 
Nearly all of these acts of physical violence have as an addi­
tional factual element, liquor consumption. Often (as in Bloom's 
case studies) the victim has been drinking. Often (but not 
always) the ultimate aggressor held a job which was distinctly 
Western in origin and new to the village, such as that of village 
policeman. 
Beyond these factual s imilarities, it is difficult to subject 
the Bloom thes is to critical examination. Drinking may be a 
motivating factor in interpersonal village aggress ion or it may 
mask other motivating factors not so easily perceived by the out-
s ider and already fixtures of Eskimo culture. A psychiatric 
trauma uniquely appropriate to the socio-cultural environment of 
Eskimo communities may influence the aggressor. But here again, 
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few cases of serious interpersonal violence from Native villages 
receive early and probing psychiatric analysis unless a defense 
attorney appoints a practitioner to determine if a defense of 
insanity can be mounted in the resultant legal proceedings. 
Bloom's allusion to Pibloktoq is not immediately persuasive. 
Others have emphasized that aggression was not among arctic 
hysteria's symptoms. In fact, if aggression manifesting itself in 
violence has emerged as a not atypical form of social interaction 
in Eskimo communities, this behavior flies in the face of tradi­
tional child rearing and socialization practices in that group 
(Briggs, 1970; Conn and Hippler, 1973:12-13; Vanstone, 1962:84). 
For a group member to commit overt aggression against another 
group member for reasons other than those closely aligned with 
group survival was fraught with risk for all but the most indif­
ferent bully (Graburn and Strong, 1973:164). 
If Bloom's thesis provides clues to a profound change in 
social behavior among Eskimos, these clues can only be explored 
within the context of the Eskimo socio-cultural environment as 
that environment either places limits upon choices available to 
individuals and to the group regarding the use of force or sets 
no limits at all. Further, each element of the equation must be 
explored. What correlation, if any, exists between the defini­
tion and treatment of mental illness and the tolerance of force 
in Eskimo society? 
What correlation, if any, exists between liquor and violence 
as Eskimo society views it? 
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Generally, what correlation exists, finally, between the 
presence or absence of sanctioned forms of aggression by indivi­
duals or collectivities and apparent antisocial behavior in 
Eskimo society and responses to it? 
While analysts may carve forms of behavior out of their 
social context for purposes of categorization, no clear reading 
of the relevance of liquor or mental disability to acts of inter­
personal violence can be formed without reference to the ways 
that Eskimo societies respond to acts of violence in more general 
instances. 
Our own society has concluded that the sick are to be treated 
and protected and, as such, should be distinguished from the 
guilty who are to be punished for deviant behavior. Whether or 
not this social doctrine has been effectively translated into 
reality, it has served to justify the development of relatively 
discrete institutions of treatment and institutions of punish-
ment. Although our complex society appears prepared to separate 
the sick from the guilty without reference to the similarity of 
their acts, our legal system rarely excuses otherwise criminal 
acts of interpersonal violence committed by mentally ill persons. 
Every form of insanity does not justify or excuse otherwise 
illegal acts. In most American courts, only a profound inability 
to appreciate the nature of one's acts, or to distinguish right 
from wrong, will allow a defendant to become a candidate for 
treatment only and not for punishment ( Polier, 1968). Thus it 
can be argued that even in our complex society the legal system 
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has not incorporated into its response of definitions the devel­
oped categories of mental impairment established by specialists 
as vehicles for diagnosis and for treatment. 
Also, often separate and apart from the medical specialist's 
response to recognized forms of illnesses and their symptoms are 
societal norms which suggest the ways that ordinary people should 
respond to the intoxicated-and-violent or the sick-and-violent. 
Tolerance, indifference, retreat, engagement or referral may each 
be cons idered appropriate in particular settings in response to 
particular actors who have been violent particular ways. These 
assessments are personalized in the extreme when social intimates 
are involved (Black, 1976). 
This brief excursion suggests the folly of an attempt to pre­
dict rigid social responses to even acknowledged acts of social 
deviance in Eskimo society. Although an analysis of the changing 
structure of the Eskimo community can tell us something about the 
likely tolerance of violence associated with liquor or illness, 
it should surprise no one that many responses are directed first 
at the dangers created by aggression by a particular person in a 
particular setting and not at its cause. Fot it to be otherwise, 
that is, to have a response to violence defined by its cause 
seems especially unlikely in a personalized small society where 
bureaucratic departments to treat or punish have established no 
reliable presence (Conn, 1984). 
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Overview of Eskimo Social Control 
Any consideration of the license afforded or constraints 
imposed upon drunks or madmen in Eskimo communities must begin 
with a consideration of license and constraints among Eskimos 
generally. 
Individuals in the traditional context were expected to act 
with reference to noncoerci ve social cues. Beyond that, they 
were autonomous (Honigmann, 1967:96; Spencer, 1959:161-62). 
Those who acted so as to challenge the autonomy of others were 
talked about or, perhaps, ridiculed. Only protracted violations 
of the rights of other people would result in what might be 
termed an overt societal response or what Marcel Mauss terms a 
moral sanction (Mauss:1950, 1979 trans:67). The societal 
response would be no more than an act or acquiescence by individ­
uals who had each personally reached a similar decision that the 
injurious party was finally no longer tolerable as an autonomous 
being. Only then was a person banished (or more often deserted) 
or executed by kin or other designated persons or otherwise 
attacked and punished (Spencer, 1959:155, 122; Steenhoven, 
1959:83; Oswalt, 1967:178). 
No overriding jural authority measured or evaluated conduct. 
( See Conn and Hippler, 197 3). Individuals measured aggression. 
Reactions could be subtle such as threats expressed in a way that 
only the threatened could understand . Recipients considered the 
extent to which aggression intruded substantially upon them or 
upon those who were tied to them by kinship or by trading 
alliance. Thus, while individual violations might be excused 
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away or even reinterpreted so as not to figure into future rela­
tionships when they occurred, the carryover effect of transgres­
sions upon one or more persons created the climate for ultimate 
sanctions including an execution. Short-run forgiveness did not 
result in long-run forgetfulness. Pressures between the trans­
gressor and injured persons began to mount (Gubser, 1965: 18 4; 
Hippler and Conn, 1973:22; Steenhoven, 1959). 
Strangers 
Since a collectivity of individual opinions guided social 
control, strangers or persons isolated from other individuals 
because of an absence of previous or present relationships with 
them were in a different position than other individuals when 
they aggressed or were themselves the victims of aggression 
(Spencer, 1959:72, 73). They could call up no predictable sup­
port from kin or companions. On the other hand, what a regular 
member of the group did would be remembered and would influence 
other persons' secondary reactions to him for years afterward. 
So, in one sense, strangers were at an extreme disadvantage. In 
another sense, they were at an advantage since, with no pre­
history, initial reactions to their aggression might be rela­
tively mild in effect. Furthermore, less severe forms of social 
control such as gossip would be less important to a non-group 
member with no stake in his reputation among group members. A 
stranger could trespass and depart because early sanctions were 
subtle and keyed to one's concern with ongoing relationships. 
Of course, the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of 
"strangerhood" are valid or are fictional depending upon the cir-
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cumstances of Eskimo society. During the period when favorable 
association with a marauding hunting group was critical to sur­
vival and physical or social isolation meant certain death, 
strangers were probably more concerned with firming up relation­
ships than they were of taking undue advantage of their special 
situation and thereby enhancing it. Yet in the modern epoch of 
settlements, mixed wage and subsistence economies, ready trans­
port from village to village or village to town, and bureaucratic 
support for individuals outside of their societal contect, the 
constraints on strangers are less serious. In towns, like 
Bethel, Kotzebue and Barrow, village people take advantage of 
their strangerhood and behave differently. In home villages, 
ongoing relationships can still be affected by inappropriate 
behavior but the ultimate stake is now at worst continued resi­
dence in the community rather than life or death. Reliable and 
depersonalized legal services are still not reliable in most 
Alaska villages. Where they exist, state personnel who police, 
prosecute and defend are strangers to village people so rapid do 
they turn over positions. This means that that the relative 
social constraints of social control upon stranger and non­
stranger are still relevant because social control dominates as 
law does not (Black, 1976) . 
How might a stranger be dealt w ith when he is deviant? 
People might consider active and early reactions to aggression by 
strangers. These acts might be considered " overreaction" or 
overinvolvement in the business of a fellow villager. Yet not 
only will the stranger depart, but he will leave behind no kin or 
-10-
allies to continue a feud. So aggression against him and by him 
leaves fewer ripples in the pond of community life. 
A review of articles on mental illness and alcohol use among 
Eskimos suggests that a fictional transformation of the rela­
tionship between a known resident and his counterparts into a 
temporary, fictional relationship between a stranger and 
strangers sometimes allows for normally unacceptable aggression 
and counter-aggression to occur without displacing or violating 
more generally the traditional norms of interpersonal relation­
ships between villagers. 
Mental Illness, Violence and the Eskimo Community 
Most investigators would subscribe to the thesis that nor­
mality and abnormality for Eskimos or other cultural groups can 
be fully understood only by analyzing definitions of illness, the 
process of treatment and other aspects of critical interaction 
between the "sick" and the "healthy" in that group (Opler, 1956). 
However, one can argue that there is some failure to abide by 
that dictum in the largely Western analysis and organization of 
findings by Vallee (1966) and Murphy and Leighton (1965). Each 
sets out to determine the range of acquaintanceship which Eskimo 
groups have with variant forms of mental illness. Both disco­
vered a range of possible etiological categories which if 
correctly arranged could be matched with recognized Western types 
of mental illness. However, the price of this organization has 
been to reinterpret what Eskimo informants have offered as rela­
tively indefinite, individualized and transitional "clusters of 
conduct" and reacted to as such into relatively permanent and 
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recognizable disease forms. The result is that no realistic 
appreciation of response to illness-and-violence can take place 
unless the analysis of diagnosis and treatment is returned to its 
more general setting of perception and response to antisocial 
behavior. 
Vallee isolated from symptoms denoting probably epilepsy, 
hysteria or acute depression, behavior which suggested to Eskimos 
that the victim was likely to harm himself or others. This 
malady was called quajimaillituq, "he does not know what he is 
doing" or "he does foolish things" (Vallee, 1966:67-73). 
Although Vallee stresses that this is not a diagnostic label, 
he concludes that this kind of behavior is handled by Eskimos in 
a special way because its origin is infection by the devil when a 
person does not live correctly. As such, it is contagious among 
Eskimos with similar propensities but not among non-Eskimos 
(1966:71). The Eskimo community's response to aggression by such 
a person is to have persons less susceptible and, therefore, 
Western non-Eskimo specialists guard and contain him. In the old 
days he would have been killed if he was particularly violent 
(1966:70). This concurs with Van Den Steenhoven's findings among 
the Keewatin Eskimos (Steenhoven, 1959:86). 
In the modern epoch when Eskimo communities interacted with 
non-Native legal agencies, Vallee found that these agencies were 
usually requested to remove the victim of quajimaillitug from the 
settlement. Communities knew from "show trials" produced in 
Eskimo settings by the Canadian government that execution of 
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insane persons would not be tolerated by white police authorities 
without a full-scale judicial inquiry and severe punishment by a 
court prepared to give the Eskimos a first hand demonstration of 
the law of the Crown (Myers, 1966: 44-46). 
How does "treatment" of one who is possesed by the devil com­
pare with the more general response to one who is antisocial? 
Al though Vallee provides no comparative data, it would appear 
that the response of the modern Eskimo community has been 
substantially more aggressive to the victim than his acts would 
have merited traditionally. Vallee suggests that this pattern of 
mental illness which is described as akin to "rabid dogs during a 
violent phase of their sickness" ( 1966: 68) has, in fact, never 
resulted in physical injury and taken no reported form other than 
"striking out" at close friends or relatives or verbal threats to 
non-Native institutions (1966: 75). In fact, one person who was 
termed in a state of guajimailli tug by Eskimos was called "bad 
tempered" by police authorities (1966: 74). 
Non-Eskimos who remove this kind of sick person have been 
criticized for trying to deal with the victim as if he were him­
self. However, because he is possessed, it appears that liber­
ties could be taken with his body by fellow Eskimos. He could be 
pummeled. Vallee, ever therapeutic, suggests that this was the 
equivalent of shock treatment (1966: 71). 
By another interpretation, what has really emerged in the 
Hudson Bay region is an acceptable justification for actively 
responding to violence or even threats of violence within the 
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prevailing social control structure. A category of persons could 
be set apart by their behavior and dealt with differently and 
more actively than their antisocial counterparts who were not 
possessed. Outright killing would not be tolerated by represent­
atives of white institutions. But physical restraint, beatings 
and exile by fellow Eskimos would go unpunished by Western law. 
It would be tolerated both by kin and allies and sanctioned by 
the dominant white society. 
What quajimaillitug seems to be for Eskimos of that Canadian 
region is not a medical diagnosis by an Eskimo group, but instead 
a social diagnosis of persons who are troubling or possible 
troublemakers but who have not yet crossed the boundary which 
separates probable deviants who are usually talked about from 
deviants who are acted against. Devi 1 possession as a charac­
terization of behavior transforms the victim from peer to 
stranger. He may be acted upon in a fashion which is then accep­
table to his Eskimo kin and acceptable to non-Eskimo ins ti tu­
tions. At the same time it provides a mechanism for separating 
the condition (which is to say, his behavior) from its bearer, 
the hapless victim and his allies. He is not responsible for his 
acts. Neither are his peers responsible to him for their acts 
upon him. 
Put another way, within the context of Eskimo social control, 
separation of the self-who-threatens from the self-everyone­
should-leave-alone has two virtues: 
1. It provides a rationale for early and vigorous interven-
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tion to forestall violence in ways that are then acceptable to 
the smaller Native and larger white societies. 
2. It allows for comportment by the victim and reactive com­
portment by members of his community which do not permanently fix 
their ongoing relationships so as to create an ongoing feud. 
Neither side is stigmatized by its conduct as bullies were perma­
nently stigmatized by their conduct (Conn and Hippler, 
1973: 23-24). 
Murphy and Leighton found a general acquaintanceship among 
Siberian Eskimos with a variety of symptoms which comprise forms 
of diagnosible mental illness. However, they emphasized, 
Eskimos described acts and not permanent postures. States of 
being were offered by informants who put no particular emphasis 
on their permanence. Neither did they demonstrate embarrassment 
when close relatives were discussed (1965: 103-4). Their charac­
terization of the symptomological attributes of mental illness as 
impermanent seems to be logical for several reasons. 
First, because when viewed as a whole, there was little or no 
organized system of ideas which served as a basis for recognizing 
treatment as a necessary response to odd or threatening behavior 
prior to Eskimo engagement with Western medical systems (Chance, 
1962: 412� Lantis, 1959). 
Second, the described bases for diseases in the Eskimo 
belief system, e. g. , object or spirit intrusion, sorcery, breach 
of taboos or loss of soul, each suggest an already perceived 
relationship between physical maladies and psychotherapeutic mat-
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ters. Treatment of physical disease by healers or shamen 
stressed ( and stresses) what we popularly term a "whole man" 
approach which emphasizes, in turn, patient involvement in the 
healing process and most especially renewed participation and 
reintegration into the group (Murphy, 1964: 78). 
Yet, when a person acted in ways which threatened his peers, 
the response of group members was more circumspect. Specialists 
may have been involved (Murphy, 1964: 68; Vallee, 1966). There 
may have been some debate as to the social providence of these 
acts by persons less concerned with causation than the intrusive, 
aggressive behavior involved (Steenhoven, 1959:86). For example, 
among the Nunamuit there was little sympathy for persons who were 
neurotic or borderline psychotics. Such persons, when given to 
irrational flareups or angry outbursts to the detriment of social 
relationships were considered not sick but "out of balance" 
(Gubser, 1965:212) and in permanent disfavor. 
It appears that Eskimos viewed manifestations of mental 
illness which were especially antisocial (that is, threatening or 
burdensome) in a variety of ways. They were stigmatizing in some 
instances, transitory in still others and interpreted away in 
some cases when it was suggested that the acts were performed by 
one under the control or possession of exterior forces. People 
in Eskimo societies as in our own were often prepared to deal 
with illness as behavior. A blanket characterization of a person 
as sick was not useful to him or to the group unless one wished a 
permanent breach in relationships. To so designate a person who 
becomes angry with little provocation would do little to further 
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continuing social relationships. Whether known as "sick" or 
"bad" those ongoing relationships would be impaired. Far 
superior to this would be a characterization of his conduct as 
transitory or better yet, as not really of his own doing. 
Further exploration of the literature allows us to test these 
propositions. 
Carpenter presents several illustrative cases of persons 
viewed as mad among the Ai vilik Eskimos because of bewitchment 
for past, unconfessed acts, including murder and theft 
(Carpenter, 1968; 1953). Each afflicted person was, in turn, 
prone to antisocial violence and was a consequent burden on the 
community. 
Kainuk, bewitched by his wife, attacked his daughter with 
rocks and edged instruments. Even though the community was at 
this time in contact with white institutions there was talk of 
doing him in before he died of mysterious causes (1968:59). 
A second victim, aggrieved over a theft she had not con­
fessed, began to attack people by biting them. Although 
Carpenter writes of the community's patience, this victim was 
confined by her peers in a coffin-like box with bars across the 
top and finally sent to a non-Native mental hospital where she 
regressed into a catatonic state (1968:61). 
Two other women who had come to the community from other 
settlements fell ill and acted in ways termed hostile, dangerous 
and vilently antisocial. The first was confined in a barred 
-17-
igloo for months until removed to an outside hospital. The 
second, who attacked children, was tied up and tortured by com­
munity members to elicit a confession regarding the cause of her 
possession (1968:63). 
While Carpenter addresses the community's interpretation of 
the causes behind antisocial behavior from a therapeutic perspec­
tive, it is also possible to view the acts and responses in 
another way. What he recorded may have been an explanation for 
conduct which allowed fellow Eskimos to permanently isolate these 
people in a manner which would have been considered far too 
aggressive had the victims been viewed as normal. Walling indi­
viduals away in an igloo is extraordinary conduct in a community 
where jails were not traditional forms of social control and are 
still fixtures of territorial law and not community law. Since 
Western law made execution a crime under its laws, it may be that 
treating a person as crazy and dangerous is the best rationale 
for direct punishment where Eskimos do not operate their own 
criminal justice system. 
In other situations, a characterization of persons as not­
themselves provided a mechanism for near-term tolerance of anti­
social behavior and longterm excuse. But it appears that the 
same kind of interpretation among the Aivilik for a pattern of 
behavior provided a rationale for newly institutionalized 
aggression, short of murder, when alternate forms of tradition­
ally sanctioned violence were prohibited by white police repre­
sentatives. At the same time, the "possessed" interpretation 
allowed for a slim possibility of recovery. A person could be 
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dealt with for antisocial but not necessarily criminal acts. In 
exchange, the victim was offered an after-the-fact excuse; so 
were community members who dealt with him aggressively. 
A neat juxtaposition of symptoms and response-to-symptoms of 
bewitched Eskimos is offered in descriptions of Pibloktoq pro­
vided by Gussow (1960) . Pibloktoq is arctic hysteria. Victims 
follow a predictable pattern of withdrawal or irritability, wild 
excitement, convuls ions and stupor and recovery (Hsu, 1961: 263) . 
Significantly, victims did not lash out at others during their 
seizures nor did their fellow Eskimos expect them to do so 
(Gussow, 1960: 229; Parker, 1964: 78) . Victims were "ignored" or 
protected from the environment in ways that did not suggest fear 
of them (Gussow, 1960: 229-31) . Persons afflicted by their 
hysteric behavior were not stigmatized. Hysteric behavior was 
either joked about by the victim and his or her kin or not men­
tioned after it happened. 
While the cause of Pibloktoq has been the central focus for 
debates (Hsu, 1961: 262-74), it would seem that there is relative 
unanimity about the community's response. Parker (1964) focuses 
upon this interplay between a victim and his peers in the tradi­
tional socio-economic context. In that epoch, hysteric episodes 
which resulted in conduct not burdensome, lengthy or dangerous 
could be tolerated and even integrated into normal patterns of 
interpersonal conduct (Parker, 1962: 80) . Victims seemed by their 
behavior to attract limited intervention and a response which 
reflected their continuing acceptance within the communal struc­
ture of society. They ran amok but in so doing did not separate 
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themselves by their acts from other persons. Nor were they iso­
lated by the response of individuals, either at the moment of 
hysteria or in the period which followed. 
The Eskimo response was to treat the episodes as transitory 
or normal aspects of the life cycle. This allowed the conduct to 
be forgotten. The hysteria, itself, was transitory. 
reaction to conduct of the victim seemed necessary 
No longterm 
to protect 
community members. Thus unlike other cases of "possession, " the 
combined effects of its predictable non-violence, its transitory 
nature and its ready categorization made Pibloktoq a tolerable 
interpersonal syndrome in traditional Eskimo society. 
Among documented cases of Pibloktoq which Gussow republishes 
is an interesting example of conduct which does not fit within 
the anticipated line of symptoms. In that example, a victim 
climbed a cliff and entered a tent where three children were 
sleeping with a knife in hand. On its face, this would appear to 
be a more serious manifestation of mental illness than those 
reported by persons considered bewitched or possessed by devils. 
However, the victim's extraordinary strength and stupor were 
characterized as Pibloktoq by the children's father. He followed 
the man and "quietly took the knife out of his hand and at that 
moment the man (victim) collapsed (Gussow, 1960:222, republishing 
report of Steed, 1947-8:384). 
The case suggests that something more than spontaneous reac­
tion to random acts was at work for Pibloktoq victims as well as 
for other forms of mental disorder. While "possession" syndromes 
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described by Vallee and Carpenter called forth what would nor­
mally appear to be overreactions by other individuals, this case 
suggests that arctic hysteria as a form of behavior called forth 
what would be called an underreaction even when the victim 
deviated from the classical symptoms. 
Review 
In all of the cases thus far explored, the persons who act 
out are not powerful enough to receive more tolerance than they 
are thought to deserve by their peers. If the symptoms of his 
illness (his behavior pattern) are non-violent, temporary and 
easily severable from the normal acts of the known person, they 
cause less concern. Where the symptoms are more frequent, more 
antisocial and not readily distinguishable, from a person who is 
"bad" or "sick" or both, greater stress is placed on theories of 
causation by individuals in the community (as opposed to 
physicians) . A frequent view is that the victim is not under his 
own control. This interpretation transforms the aggressor into a 
fictional temporary stranger. He is as a stranger to his peers. 
This characterization frees him from permanent stigmatization if 
he can recover and it frees other persons from blame for preemp­
tive and aggressive steps taken to protect themselves or merely 
to remove the dangerous-but-weak stranger from their midst while 
awaiting "the return" of the normal person. 
Alcohol, Violence and Eskimo Communities 
In the preceding survey of reactions to symptoms of mental 
illness in various Eskimo communities, I suggested that special 
interpretations or rationales were constructed in order for indi-
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viduals to deal earlier and more directly with persistent, abnor­
mal types while at the same time ignoring or downplaying the 
importance of short term aberrant behavior in societies like the 
Eskimos where leaving one another alone is the expected norm and 
where longterm relationships matter. Obviously, one pragmatic 
sign of abnormality would be a sick person's special indifference 
to cues or subtle approaches such as gossip or withdrawal which 
communicated disapproval. 
As Honigmann put it, "By themselves, Eskimos leave it largely 
to individuals to recognize when they have exceeded limits of 
permissible behavior. Eskimos rely heavily on shame or guilt to 
signal that they have done wrong or merited disapproval" 
(Honigmann, 1965:242). 
When shame in the eyes of other people becomes less relevant, 
it would seem that absent additional external controls (such as 
police) the potential for unchecked individual antisocial conduct 
would be great. It appears that alcohol use also sets the stage 
for a temporary and allowable suspension of shame in many Eskimo 
situations that gives rise in turn to violence unchecked by tra­
ditional social control. 
MacAndrew and Edgerton (1969) argue persuasively that beyond 
its universal physical impact upon certain psychomotor skills, 
the behavior associated with alcohol use is fundamentally that 
which the society has come to expect from one who drinks 
(1969:88). The state of being drunk is the social vehicle 
through which members of some cultures take "time out" from the 
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normative demands of that culture as they define appropriate 
behavior. This occurs, suggest the authors (citing the classic 
Horton (1943) study of drinking practices in many cultures) , even 
where that behavior is especially aggressive (1969: 91). 
There is a built-in social excuse in being drunk. It is 
reflected in more limited societal restraints imposed by many 
cultures upon aggression while drunk compared with aggression 
while sober (MacAndrew, 1969:91, citing Washburne, 1961:262). 
Of what relevance is this hypothesis to Eskimo cultures? In 
Eskimo groups where casual aggression ranging from threats to 
acts are so antisocial as to recharacterize the actor's con­
tinuing relationship with others, alcohol use could be enormously 
attractive as a vehicle for short-term but excusable madness. 
The difficulty which group members had with aggressive forms of 
madness was often that the lines between the special comportment 
and normal comportment were blurred. Pibloktoq was not merely 
nonaggressive; it was a clear-cut transformation of personality. 
It was easier to become bewitched than to be unbewitched in the 
eyes of the community. However, one could drink or not drink and 
therefore be drunk or not drunk. One experienced alcohol and 
then (as everyone came to know) it passed out of the system. 
As with other societies, early experience with alcohol had 
yielded mixed results. Some 19th century sources suggest that 
coastal Alaska Eskimos merely became happy when drunk and only 
occasionally caused trouble (Gubser, 1965:12). The Takamiut, 
studied by Graburn, had tried liquor but did not like it 
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(1969:186). The Nunamiut were also not drinkers in the early 
1960s (Gubser, 1965:27). Yet, for all of this, the literature 
and records associated with criminal justice in Canada and Alaska 
echo Bloom's association of liquor with extreme violence, 
described earlier (Kelso, 1977). 
Captain Healy of the Revenue Cutter Corwin placed an une­
quivocal opinion in his log of 1884: 
Naturally peaceful, of a kindly and hospitable disposi­
tion and seldom, if ever, quarrelsome when sober, under 
the influence of a small quantity of liquor they 
(Eskimos) become demonic. The most brutal fights occur 
when they are in this condition. Their long, sharp 
hunting knives make frightful wounds, and their rifles 
are used without stint and often with deadly effect. In 
former years our surgeon has often been called upon to 
dress these wounds on the bodies of several (Natives). 
I have seen marks of bullet wounds received in these 
drunken brawls, and the Omalik of the Diomedes, a com­
paratively young man, bears three deep scars which he 
proudly told me he had received in fights, and as 
proudly boasted of having killed two men while drunk. 
(Healy, 1889:17-18) 
Healy's description may have been self-serving (Binket-Smith, 
1922). His voyages were, after all, directed against whiskey 
traffic and subsidized by Congressional appropriations for that 
purpose. Yet other observers, among them Eskimos, suggest some 
direct association between drinking and unchecked aggression. 
Honigmann explored the introduction of legal drinking into the 
Eskimo community of Frobisher Bay. He noted an Eskimo ideologi­
cal association between violent conduct and drinking which outran 
actual instances at Frobisher Bay (1965:203). However, his own 
observations took place in a town environment where Canadian 
Mounties reacted to public drunkenness with arrests before the 
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conduct of the drunk became aggressive (1965:136) . 
Eskimo informants were suggesting to Honigmann 
Perhaps the 
the probable 
social transformation which they had observed in an individual's 
capacity to respond to social cues. Also, they may have con­
sidered the impact of liquor in settlements and camps where there 
were no police. 
If one accepts the idea that drinking behavior is learned, it 
is relatively easy to discover why Eskimo peoples learned a form 
of drinking behavior that did not mesh with other activities. 
The drinking habits of whites in the Arctic often involved rapid 
consumption of existing supplies and violent swings in personal­
ities from sober to drunk to sober again. These changes in con­
duct on the part of military men, whaling crews and other 
foreigners did not change their relative power or status posi­
tions in their group once they were sober as far as the Eskimos 
could observe. By this same token, if one adopts the MacAndrew­
Edgerton argument, then one can expect changes in " drunken com­
portment" as the models for the social uses of alcohol and 
alcohol-related behavior are broadened. 
Village Alaska today presents an environment where alcohol­
related conduct runs the spectrum from limited non-violent cere­
monial drinking to the violent binge. Most villages have little 
or no reliable police service. Unlike Frobisher Bay, traditional 
restraints on interpersonal conduct are not reinforced by law 
except when physical injuries are incurred and are reported. 
Therefore, to the extent that there are preventative limits set 
on antisocial conduct, they are set by socio-cultural mechanisms 
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within the group. 
From observations and interviews in Alaska Eskimo villages, 
one can construct a list of social connotations to drinking, 
reflected in reactions or in the absence of reactions to a person 
who drinks and misbehaves: 
1. Many people accept as a fixture of their social reality 
the separation of the sober self from the self when drunk. One 
is not stigmatized by his conduct when drunk when he returns to 
his sober self. 
2. People are not expected to have remembered what they did 
or why they did it when they are drunk. 
3. People recognize that conduct of other persons while 
drunk, while unpleasant or even dangerous, is temporary. After 
all, it is not the sober person who is acting but the drunk per­
son. 
These social connotations are similar to those drawn from the 
implications of acts for normal, bad persons and persons who are 
possessed in the Canadian north. A second set of norms follow 
from the first. These norms suggest that a different level of 
societal response is appropriate for dealing with drunken 
aggression and that more normal indirect or passive responses to 
misbehavior may not be appropriate or necessary. 
1. Because a person who is drunk and antisocial places him­
self in reckless peril, someone should intervene to restrain him. 
That person should not intervene if one is merely drinking. This 
norm is echoed in the Alaska law which decriminalized public and 
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private drunkenness. 
2. Drinking persons whose behavior is known to be violent 
when intoxicated should be restrained before they become violent 
and can be restrained without damage to ongoing relationships 
because community or individual intervention is, after all, 
against a stranger. This norm flies in the face of Alaska legal 
process and its decriminalization of public and private drinking. 
3. Punishment of the sober person is inappropriate although 
removal of excuses for doing some bad things while drunk can 
occur through discussions with the sober person. 
4. Since being drunk is not per se socially disapproved, one 
can join the person in this "second state" or retreat and leave 
him alone. The responsibility for making correct decis ions is 
shifted to the sober persons who must respond to the intoxicated 
person. It is not his problem. 
There appear to be significant parallels between states of 
madness and states of intoxication in Eskimo communities. Each 
suggests altered relationships between individuals and their peers 
reflected in characterizations and excuses for actions on the 
part of the individual and on the part of community members. To 
the extent that these states provide an excuse for antisocial 
acts, the consequences are special in one respect; they do not 
seem to carry over into a chain of reactions and counterreactions 
which marked the ongoing feuds between bullies and other people 
in traditional times. However, behavior-while-intoxicated like 
behavior-while-mad is subject to overriding limitations. The 
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core of any decision on community reaction is the possible coun­
terreaction. The issue of appropriate conduct is now as before 
two-sided. 
is still 
control. 
Community or individual reaction to drunken behavior 
constrained by first principles of Eskimo social 
At stake is the relative autonomy of equal members of 
Eskimo society and ongoing relationships. 
Overall, there is perhaps more caution exercised in challeng­
ing a drunk then in challenging a madman. The former will, after 
all, regain his wits and he may harbor lingering resentments. 
Also, the non-Eskimo legal system supports (in its perverse way) 
tougher treatment of madmen than drunks by offering to remove 
madmen. 
Should drunken conduct and mental 
disassociation of the self from self 
illness, each marked by 
be combined into a new 
recognized form of Eskimo psychopathology? Kaplan and Johnson 
( 1964) argue that violence attendant to binge drinking among 
Navajos directed toward an overt and often conscious attack on 
normal social arrangements is such a form. Because it is a new 
kind of mental disorder, even for the traditional, psychothera­
peutically attuned Navajo, there are no curing ceremonies on a 
par with The Moth Way or The Blessing Way. The police are the 
usual remedy (1964:226). 
Here, again, as with the categories of mental disability 
defined from a spectrum of symptoms by other ethnographers, there 
is a danger in early and over-categorization. Navajos and 
Eskimos engage in several forms of drinking. All drinking by all 
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Eskimos does not spill over into violent aggression. 
just as some mental illness does. 
Clues in Social Structure 
Some does 
A more productive approach for understanding the relationship 
between drinking and violence would be to consider the dynamic 
quality of Eskimo society. Changes in social experience among 
Eskimos may have encouraged aggressive acting out as a more prev­
alent form of social activity. There may also be a difference 
between traditional and now modern reactions to antisocial symp­
toms of mental illness or intoxication. 
If one concurs with Parker (1962) , the documented symptoms of 
reoccuring Eskimo psychopathology in Canada were defined in part 
by the socio-cultural environment of that society in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Thus, aggressive behavior or fantasies of 
acting out against others were then inappropriate, even for mad­
men { Parker, 1962:78) . There are several explanations for this. 
If one emphasizes the interplay of symptoms and their social 
mi lieu { Paul, 196 7: 150-6 5) , and views symptoms as a plea for 
help to the group, then hysteric symptoms of Pibloktoq would 
attract attention and reintegrative treatment by people for whom 
communal values were high . Overt aggression by the hysteric 
would do little more than exacerbate the di vision between the 
sick person and his society or create the burden that would have 
made destruction of the offender a likely outcome before ongoing 
white contact in those early days { see Spencer, 1959:319-20) . 
The assumption here is that traditional repression of overt 
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aggress ion instilled through child rearing and later socializa­
tion carried over even to the adults who were ill (Vanstone, 
1962: 84). Furthermore, there were a variety of socially approved 
outlets for overt or ill-concealed aggression. These included 
sanctioned executions of the non-productive and burdensome 
(young, old and insane), the drum dance and some Shamanistic 
activities among camp or band members (Graburn, 1973: 99). 
Depending upon his personal strength or his alliances, an Eskimo 
could murder, commit revenge (collective or individual), take a 
wife or any other thing with impunity (Steenhoven, 1959: 73 ) .  In 
addition, hunting as a central activity was an outlet for accep-
table aggression. Oswalt states, "When men subsisted by hunting 
and killing animals for food, many of their stresses could be 
released by violent actions against animals" (Oswalt, 1970: 79). 
Each of these described outlets for sanctioned or unchallenged 
aggression in traditional culture has been foreclosed or narrowed 
through contact with the dominant white society (Graburn, 
1969: 193). 
Ironically, one new role which has provided a sanctioned 
outlet for aggression is that of the village policeman. Yet the 
premise of the job, that as a policeman, a fellow villager has a 
special license to intervene and constrain his peers or tell them 
what to do, is not always accepted by a policeman's peers. The 
pressures upon young local police to drink and thereby join their 
friends are immense. Several police have, like Bloom's patients, 
buckled under the strain and engaged in violent acts against 
others and themselves. 
-30-
The problems of village policemen suggest a second argument 
that over and above a diminution of sanctioned outlets for 
aggression , culture change, itself, has placed new and special 
pressures on some members of society reflected in mental illness 
and social deviance (Chance, Rin and Chu, 1966:197-216). Young 
males who have undertaken Western roles in villages, such as 
police, storekeepers and power plant operators, demonstrate 
stronger affinities for Western roles than their counterparts. 
However , they have little or no means to do more than imitate the 
professions they emulate, given the absence of training and sup­
port in their home communities. The result, Parker notes 
( 1962: 261-7 4), is often that these same persons conceal 
undirected hostility toward Western institutions along with nega-
ti ve feelings about traditional values. Other surveys suggest 
that Eskimos with high identification with non-Native values but 
with little opportunity to apply them will show a higher rate of 
mental illness (Chance, 1966). The culture change hypothesis 
suggests why store managers and police in villages may be under 
special pressures which lead to mental illness, drink and 
violence. Yet all of those who take up these roles are not so 
frustrated. 
While it is clear that certain outlets for violence have been 
foreclosed, has a comparable level of violence been channeled 
into the reactions and counterreactions attendant with alcohol 
use and mental illness? 
One thing is clear. Drunken behavior has taken up too impor­
tant a role within the realm of interpersonal dealings , espe-
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cially as it is used to excuse aggression, to be easily 
eradicated whatever the relationship of law to drunken behavior . 
However, law in this realm can serve ends which are useful or 
not useful from the standpoint of Eskimo premises and assumptions 
of Eskimo social control amongst themselves. 
If I have correctly discerned a severance of the drunk or ill 
self f rorn the normal self, then alcohol prevention programs or 
legal processes which assume that the prevalent belief is that 
communities or individuals consign responsibility for acts corn­
mi tted while intoxicated on persons when again sober are mis­
guided. Even non-drinking cornrnuni ty members must be reoriented 
toward connecting the sober and intoxicated person as a prelude 
to effectuation of education or law enforcement programs. New 
outlets for acceptable aggression must be sought, ones which do 
not require drinking as a prerequisite. 
A person "possessed" is likely to act violently 1 he is also 
likely to be acted upon in a violent manner. Drinkers or men­
tally ill persons should be viewed as the potential targets of 
aggression not only by fellow drinkers but by those who claim 
cornrnuni ty authority. The data provided by Vallee and Carpenter 
suggest both interpretations. 
Law and Social Control - Renewing the Relationship 
The legal reaction to drunken behavior in Eskimo villages has 
moved over time from one that penalized being drunk in public or 
private to one that seeks to prevent drinking by means of legal 
bans on importation for sale or distribution of alcohol through a 
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local option law ( AS 04. 11 . 496 and Lonner and Duff, 1983 ) . The 
law does not ban, however, private possession or private consump­
tion . This private consumption usually occurs in private resi­
dences . So does violence ( Conn and Boedeker, 1983 ) . Since 
drinking in private is no longer illegal, police intervention 
occurs only when residents request it . Even here, police inter­
vention is restricted to those limited situation s  when the 
drinker must be placed in " protective custody . "  ( AS 47 . 37 . 270 ) 
Although the niceties of the law were ignored in towns and vil­
lages for many years allowing police to pick up all Na ti ve 
drinkers, the current situation is that only those persons in 
need of immediate protection are taken by police to a place to 
sober up . This change from what previously was a reprehensible 
dragnet leaves the policeman with no authority to deal with 
drunks until they are violent ( Conn and Boedeker, I d . ) .  
What is the net impact of this legal posture on the inner 
logic of Eskimo social control described above? First, the 
therapeutic approach which has now replaced criminalization of 
drunken behavior, blunts and even makes illegal any preemptive 
aggressive response by sober persons to contain an intoxicated 
person . To the extent that this capacity of other persons to 
aggress upon the "temporary stranger"  who is intoxicated was a 
positive side benefit of his being intoxicated ( or mad ) in an 
Eskimo context and therefore nonresponsible, it has been removed . 
The potential for the intoxicated person to act out aggressively 
without fear of later community blame remains and is even 
heightened by the therapeutic perception of the intoxicated 
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Eskimo as "sick" and not "bad" as enunciated by health care and 
legal professionals. That his criminal acts will probably be 
punished by the distant state legal system after the fact is of 
no solice to persons whose community social control system once 
anticipated and headed off violence and did not wait for it to 
occur. 
Policing in Eskimo villages is now accomplished by persons 
hired through regional non-profit associations and guided by 
troopers. These village public safety officers are often Native 
persons but as often as not non-residents of the village. It 
would appear that this circumstance is fortuitous since lingering 
resentment from police involvement will not carry over into 
social relationships when relative strangers are involved on both 
sides. 
The core problem of making law and social control work, 
however, relates to the changing perception of drunken behavior 
by legal policymakers. It was critical that public and private 
intoxication be decriminalized in Alaska so discriminatorily were 
the laws enforced in larger cities and towns ( Friedman, 1970). 
However, the transformation of the law from penal to therapeutic 
has unwittingly served poorly the capacity of Eskimo social 
control to deal with and prevent drunken violence. The law, as 
presently operating in small Eskimo villages, has actually rein­
forced the worst premises of Eskimo perceptions of drunken behav­
ior by liberating the drinker from built-in social constraints on 
his behavior. 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that to understand the rela­
tionship between social control and law in any environment, there 
must be a closer examination of the inner logic of the social 
control which law engages . Without this deeper understanding of 
the impulses of social control, it is likely that legal process 
introduced will have effects upon it that are entirely unpredict­
able. In such instances we will know, as did Donald Black, that 
a relationship exists, without knowing to any degree the nature 
of the relationship . 
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